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Abstract
We discuss some causal estimands used to study racial discrimination in policing. A
central challenge is that not all police-civilian encounters are recorded in administrative
datasets and available to researchers. One possible solution is to consider the average
causal effect of race conditional on the civilian already being detained by the police. We
find that such an estimand can be quite different from the more familiar ones in causal
inference and needs to be interpreted with caution. We propose using an estimand new for
this context—the causal risk ratio, which has more transparent interpretation and requires
weaker identification assumptions. We demonstrate this through a reanalysis of the NYPD
Stop-and-Frisk dataset. Our reanalysis shows that the naive estimator that ignores the
post-treatment selection in administrative records may severely underestimate the disparity
in police violence between minorities and whites in these and similar data.
1 Introduction
This research note is motivated by an interesting and timely article by Knox, Lowe, and Mummolo
(2020, hereafter KLM) about learning racial disparities in policing from administrative data. One
key point made by KLM is that such investigations have an intrinsic selection bias, because
administrative records only contain those encounters in which civilians are detained. If there
is racial discrimination in police detainment in the first place, any naive analysis using the
administrative data may then suffer from potentially severe selection bias.
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Here, we present a research note on this important topic with two purposes. First, KLM
considered several local causal estimands that are being used in the empirical studies. Some of the
estimands are not routinely used in causal inference, so we would like to clarify their interpretations.
In particular, we demonstrate that the local estimands can poorly indicate the more global causal
effects. Second, we introduce a causal risk ratio estimand which is straightforward to interpret and
allows us to avoid some hard to justify assumptions. The key idea is to use the Bayes formula to
avoid the hard problem of estimating the probability of detainment in police-civiliant encounters.
We conclude this research note with a reanalysis of the New York City Police Department (NYPD)
Stop-and-Frisk dataset and some further discussion.
2 Review
We begin with a brief review of the key quantities in KLM. Following their work, the unit of
analysis is an encounter between a civilian and the police. In administrative data, there are n
encounters indexed by i = 1, . . . , n. We denote the outcome with Yi, where Yi = 1 indicates
the use of force by the police in encounter i. Next, Di is a binary variable where Di = 1 records
the race of the civilian as a minority. While the race of the civilian is not manipulable, we adopt
the approach in KLM where the counterfactual is the replacement of the civilian in an encounter
with a separate, comparable civilian engaged in comparable behavior, but differing on race. See
Knox, Lowe, and Mummolo (2020, p. 621) for a more complete discussion. Finally, we use
Mi to indicate the presence of a police detainment or stop. Critically, Mi = 1 for all i in the
administrative data. KLM also invoked the potential outcomes framework, such that we have
the potential mediator Mi(d) which represents whether encounter i would have resulted in a
stop if civilian race is d. Next, Yi(d,m) is the potential outcome for the use of force if race is
d and the mediating variable is set to m; similarly, Yi(d) is the potential outcome if race is d.
Throughout this note we make the consistency or stable unit treatment assumption (SUTVA), so
Mi(Di) = Mi and Yi(Di,Mi) = Yi(Di) = Yi. Finally, Xi represents a collection of covariates
that describe aspects of the encounter. These include measures for time of day, location, age,
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Figure 1: KLM’s directed acyclic graph (DAG) model for racially discrimination in policing with an
unmeasured mediator-outcome confounder U . Administrative records only contain observations
with M = 1.
sex, and the like. Hereafter, we drop the i subscript.
KLM studied the following “naive” treatment effect estimand:
∆ = E[Y | D = 1,M = 1]− E[Y | D = 0,M = 1], (1)
where E denotes expectation over a random police-civilian encounter. Intuitively, ∆ compares the
average rates of force between different racial groups who are detained by police. KLM showed
that, if there is racial discrimination in detainment and an unmeasured confounder between
detainment and use of force (see Figure 1), ∆ can be quite misleading when used to represent
the causal effect of race on police violence.
The key issue is that the structure of the data implies all estimates are conditional on M—a
post-treatment variable. It is well known that conditioning on post-treatment variables often
leads to biased estimators of the causal effect (Rosenbaum 1984). In the causal graphical model
literature, bias of this type is an instance of the collider bias that arises when we condition on
the common child of two variables in a causal diagram (Greenland, Pearl, and Robins 1999).
Bias of this type occurs in many applied problems in social science (Elwert and Winship 2014;
Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018) and medicine (Paternoster, Tilling, and Davey Smith
2017).
Despite this collider bias, using the principal stratification framework of Frangakis and Rubin
(2002), KLM proposed two identification strategies. They showed that it is still possible to
either identify or partially certain forms of average treatment effects using a set of tailored
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causal assumptions. These assumption include mandatory reporting, mediator monotonicity, and
treatment ignorability.
Here, we briefly comment on the mandatory reporting assumption. KLM write this assumption
as:
Assumption 1 (Mandatory reporting). (i) Y (0, 0) = Y (1, 0) = 0 and (ii) the administrative
dataset contains all police-civilian encounters.
It is important to note that this assumption is both a restriction on potential outcomes
and a feature of the data collection. The first part of the assumption says that the potential
outcome Y (d,m) is equal to 0 whenever m = 0. This assumption is reasonable because, besides
inadvertent collateral damage, there should be virtually no police violence if the civilian is not
stopped by the police in the first place. The second part of the assumption is needed so that we
can use the administrative dataset to get the conditional distribution of (D,Y,X) given M = 1.
For a given administrative data source, it is possible that some police stops are unrecorded. If
true, any analysis relying on Assumption 1 needs to be interpreted with care.
Using these assumptions, KLM derived nonparametric bounds for
ATEM=1 = E[Y (1)− Y (0) |M = 1].
They also derived a point identification strategy for
ATTM=1 = E[Y (1)− Y (0) | D = 1,M = 1],
which depends on an external estimate of the proportion of racial detainments among reported
minority encounters, i.e. P(M(0) = 0 | D = 1,M = 1). See KLM (p. 631) for discussion on
estimating this quantity. Their second solution is an identification result for the average treatment
effect ATE = E[Y (1)− Y (0)] given external estimates of P(M = 1 | D = d) for d = 0, 1.
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3 Average treatment effects conditional on the mediator
In many causal analyses, investigators are focused on the sample average treatment effect (ATE),
which is the average difference in potential outcomes averaged over the study population. At
times, researchers define the ATE over specific subpopulations which makes the ATE more local;
e.g. the average treatment effect might be defined for the subpopulation exposed to the treatment
or the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). In general, the “global” ATE is the goal
in most studies and is preferred over more local effects.(Gerber and Green 2012, ch. 2). For
example, IV studies have been strongly critiqued for identifying a local average treatment effect
(LATE) instead of the global ATE (Deaton 2010; Swanson and Hernán 2014). Moreover, even
defenders of IV studies, view the LATE as a “second choice” estimand compared to the global
ATE (Imbens 2014).
As KLM outline, the global ATE has not generally been the target causal estimand in this
literature. Instead, researchers have focused on ATEM=1 and ATTM=1 which are both conditional
on the mediator M . As such, these estimands are both more local than the global ATE but
also condition on a post-treatment quantity. However, they are not the first estimands in causal
inference that condition on post-treatment quantities. Other examples of estimands that condition
on post-treatment quantities include the survivor average treatment effect in Frangakis and
Rubin (2002) (though conceptually the always survivor principal stratum can be thought as a
pretreatment variable), effect modification by a post-treatment quantity (Stephens, Keele, and
Joffe 2016; Ertefaie et al. 2018), and the probability of causation P[Y (0) = 0 | D = 1, Y = 1]
(Pearl 1999; Dawid, Musio, and Murtas 2017). An inexperienced researcher might think these
estimands are informative about the global ATE or even an estimand such as the controlled direct
effect: E[Y (1, 1)− Y (0, 1)]. Here, we build upon the population stratification framework in KLM
and clarify the difference between the conditional estimands in KLM and estimands like the global
ATE.
To simplify the illustration, we will consider the case where there is no mediator-outcome
confounder (i.e. no variable U in the diagram in Figure 1). The issues we describe below will
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still occur if there is mediator-outcome confounding. In mediation analysis, a standard way to
decompose the average treatment effect is
ATE = E[Y (1)− Y (0)] = E [Y (1,M(1))− Y (1,M(0))]+ E [Y (1,M(0))− Y (0,M(0))].
The two terms on the right hand side are called the pure indirect effect (PIE) and pure direct
effect (PDE) (Robins and Greenland 1992). Under the Non-Parametric Structural Equation
Model with Independent Errors (NPSEM-IE) model (Pearl 2009; Richardson and Robins 2013)
and Assumption 1, they can be expressed as
PIE = βM · E[Y (1, 1)], PDE = βY · E[M(0)],
where βM = E[M(1)−M(0)] is the average effect of race on detainment and βY = E[Y (1, 1)−
Y (0, 1)] is the controlled direct effect of race on police violence (See Appendix A). An immediate
consequence of the above expressions is that
ATE ≥ 0 if βM , βY ≥ 0 and ATE ≤ 0 if βM , βY ≤ 0. (2)
In words, the global ATE is nonnegative whenever both βM and βY are nonnegative, and vice
versa. This same property also holds for the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
because in the simple setting here the treatment D is completely randomized.
In Appendix A, we use principal stratification to show that neither ATEM=1 or ATTM=1 is
guaranteed to inherit the sign of βM and βY and satisfy the property in Equation (2). Specifically,
we outline concrete examples in which:
(i) βM > 0 and βY > 0, but ATEM=1 < 0;
(ii) βM < 0 and βY < 0, but ATEM=1 > 0;
(iii) βM < 0 and βY < 0, but ATTM=1 > 0.
That is, when there is racial discrimination of the same direction in both police detainment and
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the use of force, it is still possible for ATEM=1 and ATTM=1 to have the opposite sign.
Heuristically, this is due to the fact that all of the causal estimands above, including βM ,
βY , ATE, ATEM=1, and ATTM=1, only measure some weighted average treatment effect for
police detainment and/or use of force. Conditioning on the post-treatment M may correspond
to unintuitive weights. The possibility that ATEM=1 and ATE can have different signs can be
understood from the following iterated expectation:
ATE = ATEM=1 P(M = 1) + E[Y (1)− Y (0) |M = 0]P(M = 0).
In this decomposition, the second term may be nonzero and have the opposite sign of ATEM=1.
An inexperienced researcher might be tempted to drop the second term because of Assumption 1,
as Y (0, 0) = Y (1, 0) = 0 with probability 1. However, conditioning on M = 0 is not the same
as the intervention that sets M = 0. This means that we cannot deduce E[Y (d) |M = 0] = 0
from Y (d, 0) = 0, because E[Y (d) |M = 0] = E[Y (d,M(d)) |M = 0] is not necessarily equal
to E[Y (d, 0) |M = 0]. What the counterexamples in the Appendix further demonstrate is that
the discordance between ATEM=1 and ATT can occur even when the pure direct and indirect
effects have the same sign.
In sum, ATEM=1 and ATTM=1 are generally different from the estimands that are routinely
the target in causal analyses. As such, we urge applied researchers to use caution when using
these local estimands to infer anything about more common global estimands.
4 A new estimator for the causal risk ratio
KLM also derived an identification formula for ATEM=1 using external estimates of P(M = 1 |
D = d) for d = 0, 1. As noted in their paper, however it is often difficult to quantify the frequency
of stops among all police-civilian encounters. In other words, it can be difficult to determine
the magnitude of P(M = 1 | D = d). Here, we show that by formulating the estimand on a
relative scale, we can also achieve point identification and avoid the difficulties of estimating
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P(M = 1 | D = d). More specifically, we consider the causal risk ratio for covariate level x:
RR(x) =
E[Y (1) | X = x]
E[Y (0) | X = x] .
This estimand measure the relative risk of police violence and has been used in related context
(Edwards, Lee, and Esposito 2019). When this term is equal to one the risk of police violence
does not vary with the race of the civilian. When this term is greater than one, the risk of violence
is higher for minorities.
Using treatment ignorability (i.e. the DAG model in Figure 1 conditional on X) and Assump-
tion 1, we show in Appendix B that the causal effect of race can be based on the decomposition
E[Y (d) | X = x] = E[Y |M = 1, D = d,X = x] · P(M = 1 | D = d,X = x), for d = 0, 1.
The same result is derived in KLM and forms the basis of their identification of the ATE. We
simplify their proof in Appendix B and show that it does not require the mediator monotonicity and
relative nonseverity of racial stops (Assumptions 2 and 3 in KLM) as stated in their Proposition 2.
Using Bayes formula for the last term on the right hand side, we obtain
RR(x) =
E[Y | D = 1,M = 1, X = x]
E[Y | D = 0,M = 1, X = x]︸ ︷︷ ︸
naive estimand
·
{P(D = 1 |M = 1, X = x)
P(D = 0 |M = 1, X = x)
}/{P(D = 1 | X = x)
P(D = 0 | X = x)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
bias factor
.
(3)
The first term on the right hand side of (3) is the naive risk ratio estimand conditional on
baseline covariates. It is the risk ratio counterpart to the naive risk difference in (1) and both
of them ignore the possible bias from the selection process into the administrative data. The
second term inside the curly brackets is a ratio of probability ratios. The first ratio of probabilities
measures the relative probability (odds) of an encounter being with a minority conditional on X
in the administrative data. The second ratio also measures the relative probability (odds) of an
encounter being with a minority conditional on X, but these probabilities need to be estimated
from a second data source. This ratio between the last two terms is thus an odds ratio that
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characterizes the bias of the the naive estimator; for this reason we call it the “bias factor.”
That is, if minorities are over-represented in the administrative data, the bias factor corrects
that over-representation and so increases the magnitude of the risk ratio. For example, if the
probability of an encounter being with a minority is 0.8 in the administrative data and 0.25 in a
random police-civilian encounter, the bias factor would be (0.8/0.2)/(0.25/0.75) = 12, which
would increase the magnitude of the naive risk ratio when it is larger than 1. See the appendix
for a full derivation. All these terms can be estimated using generalized linear models, or one
could use more flexible models. Confidence intervals can be estimated using the bootstrap or a
simple delta method estimator.
Why use this risk ratio estimand? First of all, relative risk can be a powerful rhetorical tool
in discussing racial disparities. More importantly, by targeting the causal risk ratio, we are able,
through cancellation, to avoid the difficulties associated with estimating P(M = 1). As such,
by focusing on relative risks, we avoid key assumptions. Note that if we are willing to assume
stochastic mediator monotonicity: E[M(1) | X = x] ≥ E[M(0) | X = x] (that is, there is racial
bias against the minority in detainment), the bias factor can indeed be lower bounded by 1. In
this case, the naive risk ratio estimator (first term on the right hand side of (3)) provides a lower
bound for the causal risk ratio RR(x).
Notice that using the risk ratio estimand does not free us from the complications that tend
to arise from the use of two data sources. As we noted above, the administrative data only
contain those encounters with M = 1, so all of the identification results in KLM and in this note
require some external estimates. In particular, the administrative dataset can only be used to
estimate the first two terms on the right hand side of (3). Estimation of the third term requires
a second data source that may not be congruent with the administrative data. For example, the
administrative data in KLM is an NYPD database of police stops. For a second data source,
we could use the Current Population Survey (CPS), which contains measures for race and also
has geographic information that allows us to restrict the data to the metro area in the state of
New York (which is larger than the five boroughs of New York City). However, The CPS does
not contain any more fine-grained geographic identifiers or any measures of police encounters.
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Another possible data source is the Police-Public Contact Survey (PPCS) collected by the U.S.
Department of Justice, which contain detailed measures on police contacts. However, PPCS is
a national survey and geographic identifiers are not available to researchers. As such, if we use
the PPCS, we can do little to measure the prevalence of police-minority encounters in New York
City. In other settings such as traffic stops, one may use the “veil of darkness” test (Grogger and
Ridgeway 2006) and use night-time police stops in the same dataset to estimate the bias factor,
as police are less likely to know the race of a motorist. However, this still requires the assumption
that the racial distribution of motorists are the same during the day and at night.
Nonetheless, as we show next, the results using the risk ratio with different data sources can
still be useful. That is, we can use multiple data sources to illuminate the probable bias in the
naive estimator.
5 A reanalysis of the NYPD Stop-and-Frisk dataset
We used the identification formula (3) to estimate the causal risk ratio using the NYPD “Stop-
and-Frisk” dataset analyzed in Fryer (2019) and KLM. Specifically, we use the replication data
from KLM. As such, we followed KLM’s preprocessing of the dataset, with the one exception
that we removed all races other than black and white. We also focused on all forms of force
rather than estimate the effects for different types of force. We used CPS and PPCS data for
from to estimate the third term in (3). Because PPCS does not contain a geographic identifier,
we also used the racial distributions for different subsets of the PPCS data. Specifically, we used
subgroups for those in the survey that experienced a motor vehicle stop, any other kind of police
stop, and those in a large metro area.
Table 1 reports the estimated risk ratios using different estimators and external datasets.
Using the naive estimator—the first term in (3), we find a modest causal effect: black people
have 29% higher risk of the police using of force than white people. Recall that we can view
this as lower bound on the true causal risk ratio if we are willing to assume stochastic mediator
monotonicity (i.e. there is discrimination against black civilians in police detainments on average).
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External dataset Estimated risk ratio 95% Confidence interval
Naive estimator—First term in (3)
None 1.29 1.28–1.30
Adjusted for selection bias by using (3)
CPS 13.6 12.8–14.3
PPCS 32.3 31.3–33.3
PPCS (MV Stop) 29.5 26.9–32.7
PPCS (Stop in Public) 29.2 23.5–36.5
PPCS (Large Metro) 16.7 15.4–18.4
Table 1: Estimates of the causal effect of minority race (black) on police violence. CPS is the
Current Population Survey. PPCS is Police-Public Contact Survey. MV Stop is the subset of
survey respondents that has been the passenger in a motor vehicle that was stopped by the police.
Large Metro is the subset that lives in a region with more than 1 million population. Confidence
intervals were computed using the nonparametric bootstrap.
The estimator (3) that adjusts for the selection bias shows a very different picture. No matter
which external dataset we used, the estimated risk ratio for black versus white is always greater
than 10.
The estimates in Table 1 did not condition on any covariate that confounds the effect of race
on police use of force. A potentially important confounder is the location of the police-civilian
encounter. The NYPD currently has 77 precincts that are responsible for the law enforcement
within a designated geographic area. Using census blocks and the 2010 census data, Keefe (2020)
constructed a population breakdown for each NYPD precinct. This allows us to compare the
proportion of black residents (among black and white residents) with the proportion of detainments
of black civilians in each precinct (Figure 2). It is evident from this figure that in most of the
precincts, black civilians make up less than half of the population but more than half of the
detainment records. This shows that the bias factor in (3) can be quite large in this problem.
By using the census data to estimate the last term in (3), Figure 3 compares the naive risk
ratio estimator and selection-adjusted risk ratio estimator for each precinct. The selection-adjusted
estimates are almost always much larger except for three outliers—precincts 67 and 113, where
Blacks account for more than 90% of the population, and precinct 22 (Central Park), where
only 25 residents were recorded and the majority of police-civilian encounters were likely with
11
non-residents. It is likely that in these precincts, the residential distribution in the census data
poorly approximate the racial distribution in police-civilian encounters, because the civilians could
be visitors from other precincts or anywhere else in the world. Most of the precincts with the
highest estimated risk ratios are wealthy neighborhoods in Manhattan and Brooklyn. In several
precincts, our method estimated that the risk of police use of force for Blacks is more than
30 times higher than the risk for whites. This may be due in part to increased suspicion of
minorities in areas where there presence is not common. Finally, Figure 4 shows a strong negative
correlation between the estimated risk ratios and the percentage of black residents in the precinct.
This indicates that the racial discrimination in police use of force may be strongly moderated by
characteristics of the geographic location such as the racial composition, affluence, and average
crime rate of the neighborhood.
6 Conclusions
In this research note, we studied some causal estimands in the context of racial discrimination
in policing. We found that the ATE that conditional on the mediator (police detainment) are
generally different from the unconditional ATE and other routinely used causal estimands, so extra
caution is needed when using these estimands and interpreting the results. We also proposed
a new estimator for the causal risk ratio, which is straightforward to interpret and avoids the
difficult task of discerning the percentage of stops in all police-civilian encounters. In a reanalysis
of the NYPD Stop-and-Frisk dataset with causal risk ratio being the estimand, we found that for
blacks the risk of experiencing force is much higher than for whites.
When interpreting the results of our reanalysis, the reader should keep in mind its limitations.
First, it is difficult to find a good external dataset to estimate the bias factor. The datasets
we used should only be viewed as crude approximations to the racial distribution in police-
civilian encounters in New York City. Second, our identification of the causal risk ratio requires
treatment ignorability by conditioning on confounders such as time, location, and other relevant
characteristics of the police-civilian encounter. However, such covariates are not always available
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in external datasets. Finally, since New York is a metropolitan in which people move around
a great deal on a daily basis, the racial distribution of the residents in a precinct might poor
represents the racial distribution in police-civilian encounters, especially when the residential
distribution is extreme. Therefore, Figure 4 may have exaggerated the effect modification by the
proportion of black residents. A further analysis on carefully selected precincts (e.g. residential
areas with different racial composition) is needed to better quantify the effect modification.
Nevertheless, our empirical results show that a naive analysis of police administrative datasets
that ignores the selection bias can severely underestimate the risk of police force for minorities.
Further careful analyses are needed to better quantify the racial discrimination in policing and
understand the socioeconomic factors that moderate racial discrimination.
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(a) Proportion of black residents in the census data.
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(b) Proportion of detainments of black civilians in the NYPD
stop-and-frisk data.
Figure 2: Racial distributions (indicated by the filled color) in each NYPD precinct.
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Figure 3: Risk ratio estimates for every NYPD precinct. Error bars correspond to 95% confidence
intervals computed by the bootstrap. We did not resample the census data because that is already
the residential distribution (instead of a statistical estimate). Blue estimates are obtained using
the naive estimator (first term in (3)); Red estimates further take into account the bias factor
due to sample selection in (3).
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Figure 4: Relationship between the risk ratio estimates and the proportion of black residents
across NYPD precincts. Notice that to use the identification formula (3) for the risk ratio correctly,
we need to estimate the racial distribution in police-civilian encounters using external dataset.
The residential distribution is used as an approximation but it can be biased and exaggerate the
effect modification. See Section 6 for further discussion.
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A Average treatment effects conditional on the mediator
We assume the variables (D,M, Y ) are generated from a nonparametric structural equation
model: D = fD(D),M = fM (D, M ), Y = fY (D,M, Y ) where D, M , Y are mutually
independent (Pearl 2009). Potential outcomes for M and Y can be defined by replacing
random variables in the functions by fixed values; for example, M(d) = fM (d, M ), d = 0, 1.
Because the errors are independent, D, {M(0),M(1)}, and {Y (0, 0), Y (0, 1), Y (1, 0), Y (1, 1)}
are mutually independent (Richardson and Robins 2013). We also make the mandatory assumption
(Assumption 1). The derivations below do not need mediator monotonicity (M(1) ≥M(0)).
We next derive expressions of ATEM=1 and ATTM=1 using two basic causal effects: βM =
E[M(1)−M(0)], the racial bias in detainment, and βY = E[Y (1, 1)− Y (0, 1)], the controlled
direct effect of race on police violence. To simplify the interpretation, we introduce a new variable
to denote the the principal stratum (see Figure 2 in KLM):
S =

always stop (al), if M(0) = M(1) = 1,
minority stop (mi), if M(0) = 0,M(1) = 1,
majority stop (ma), if M(0) = 1,M(1) = 0,
never stop (ne), if M(0) = M(1) = 0,
Let S = {al,mi,ma, ne} be all possible values for S. Using this notation, we have
βM =
∑
s∈S
E[M(1)−M(0) | S = s]P(S = s) = P(S = mi)− P(S = ma).
By using the independence between M(d) and Y (d,m) and Assumption 1, it is easy to show
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that
θ =

E[Y (1)− Y (0) | S = al]
E[Y (1)− Y (0) | S = mi]
E[Y (1)− Y (0) | S = ma]
E[Y (1)− Y (0) | S = ne]

=

E[Y (1, 1)− Y (0, 1)]
E[Y (1, 1)− Y (0, 0)]
E[Y (1, 0)− Y (0, 1)]
E[Y (1, 0)− Y (0, 0)]

=

βY
βY + E[Y (0, 1)]
−E[Y (0, 1)]
0

.
Average treatment effects, whether conditional on M or D or not, can be written as weighted
averages of the entries of θ.
Proposition 1. Suppose there is no unmeasured mediator-outcome confounder (i.e. no U) in
Figure 1. Under Assumption 1, the estimands ATEM=1, ATTM=1, ATE = E[Y (1)− Y (0)], and
ATT = E[Y (1)− Y (0) | D = 1] can be written as weighted averages (wTθ)/(wT1) (1 is the
all-ones vector) with weights given by, respectively,
w(ATEM=1) =

P(S = al)[
P(S = ma) + βM
]
P(D = 1)
P(S = ma)P(D = 0)
0

, w(ATTM=1) =

P(S = al)
P(S = ma) + βM
0
0

,
and
w(ATE) = w(ATT) =

P(S = al)
P(S = mi)
P(S = ma)
P(S = ne)

=

P(S = al)
P(S = ma) + βM
P(S = ma)
P(S = ne)

.
Proof. Let’s first consider ATEM=1. By using the law of total expectations, we can first decompose
it into a weighted average of principal stratum effects:
ATEM=1 = E[Y (1)− Y (0) |M = 1] =
∑
s∈S
E[Y (1)− Y (0) |M = 1, S = s] · P(S = s |M = 1).
We can simplify the principal stratum effects using recursive substitution of the potential outcomes
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and the assumption that D, {M(0),M(1)}, and {Y (0, 0), Y (0, 1), Y (1, 0), Y (1, 1)} are mutually
independent. For m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1},
E[Y (1)− Y (0) |M = 1,M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1]
=E[Y (1,M(1))− Y (0,M(0)) |M = 1,M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1]
=E[Y (1,m1)− Y (0,m0) |M = 1,M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1]
=E[Y (1,m1)− Y (0,m0) |M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1]
=E[Y (1,m1)− Y (0,m0)].
The third equality uses the fact that M ⊥ {Y (1,m1), Y (0,m0)} | {M(0),M(1)}, because given
{M(0),M(1)} the only random term in M = D ·M(1) + (1−D) ·M(0) is D. Thus ATEM=1
can be written as
ATEM=1 = θTw(ATEM=1), where w(ATEM=1) =

P(S = al |M = 1)
P(S = mi |M = 1)
P(S = ma |M = 1)
P(S = ne |M = 1)

.
Similarly, ATTM=1, ATE, and ATT can also be written as weighted averages of the entries of θ,
where the weights are
w(ATTM=1) =

P(S = al | D = 1,M = 1)
P(S = mi | D = 1,M = 1)
P(S = ma | D = 1,M = 1)
P(S = ne | D = 1,M = 1)

, w(ATE) = w(ATT) =

P(S = al)
P(S = mi)
P(S = ma)
P(S = ne)

.
Next we compute the conditional probabilities for the principal strata in w(ATEM=1) and
w(ATTM=1). By using Bayes’ formula, for any m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1},
P(M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1 |M = 1)
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∝P(M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1) · P(M = 1 |M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1)
=P(M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1) ·
1∑
d=0
P(M = 1, D = d |M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1)
=P(M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1) ·
1∑
d=0
1{md=1} P(D = d |M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1)
=P(M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1) ·
1∑
d=0
1{md=1} P(D = d).
The last two equalities used M = M(D) and D ⊥ {M(0),M(1)}. For this, it is straightforward
to obtain the form of w(ATEM=1) in Proposition 1. Similarly,
P(M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1 | D = 1,M = 1) ∝ P(M(0) = m0,M(1) = m1) · 1{m1=1}.
From this we can derive the form of w(ATTM=1) in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Under the same assumptions as above, PIE = βM · E[Y (1, 1)] and PDE =
βY · E[M(0)].
Proof. This follows from the definition of pure direct and indirect effects and the following identity,
E
[
Y (d,M(d′′′))
]
= E
[
Y (d, 1) |M(d′) = 1] · P(M(d′) = 1) = E [Y (d, 1)] · P(M(d′) = 1),
for any d, d′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Using the forms of weighted averages in Proposition 1, we can make the following observation
on the sign of the causal estimands when βM and βY are both nonnegative or both nonpositive:
Corollary 1. Let the assumptions in Proposition 1 be given. If βM ≥ 0 and βY ≥ 0, then
ATE = ATT ≥ 0. Conversely, if βM ≤ 0 and βY ≤ 0, then ATE = ATT ≤ 0. However, both of
these properties are not true for ATEM=1 and the second property is not true for ATTM=1.
The fact that ATT and ATE would have the same sign as βM when βM and βY have the
same sign follows immediately from Proposition 2. However, this important property does not
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hold for ATEM=1 and ATTM=1. Here are some concrete counterexamples:
(i) When βM = βY = 0.01, P(S = al) = 0.1, P(S = ma) = 0.05, E[Y (0, 1)] = 0.1, and
P(D = 1) = 0.01, we have ATEM=1 = −0.003884.
(ii) When βM = βY = −0.01, P(S = al) = 0.1, P(S = ma) = 0.05, E[Y (0, 1)] = 0.1, and
P(D = 1) = 0.99, we have ATEM=1 = 0.002514.
(iii) When βM = βY = −0.01, P(S = al) = 0.1, P(S = ma) = 0.05, E[Y (0, 1)] = 0.1, and
P(D = 1) = 0.01, we have ATTM=1 = 0.0026.
The problem is that conditioning on the post-treatment variable M alters the weights on
the principal strata, as shown in Proposition 1. ATEM=1 and ATTM=1 then depend on not
only the racial bias in detainment and use of force (captured by βM and βY ) but also the
baseline rate of violence E[Y (0, 1)] and the composition of race P(D = 1). For instance, in
the first counterexample above, even though the minority group D = 1 is discriminated against
in both detainment and use of force, because the baseline violence is high and the minority
group is extremely small, ATEM=1 becomes mostly determined by the smaller bias (captured by
P(S = ma) = P(M(0) = 1,M(1) = 0)) experienced by the much larger majority group.
We make some further comments on the above paradox. First of all, the second counterexample
can be eliminated if we additionally assume P(D = 1) < 0.5, that is D = 1 indeed represents
the minority group. With this benign assumption, one can show that ATEM=1 < 0 whenever
βM , βY < 0. Furthermore, it can be shown that ATTM=1 < 0 whenever βM , βY > 0. So in a
very rough sense we might say that as causal estimands, ATEM=1 is unfavorable for the minority
group (because ATEM=1 can be negative even if both βM , βY > 0) and ATTM=1 is unfavorable
for the majority group (because ATTM=1 can be positive even if both βM , βY < 0).
Our second comment is about the first counterexample. We can eliminate such possibility
by assuming mediator monotonicity P(S = ma) = 0, or in other words, by assuming that the
majority race group is never discriminated against in any police-civilian encounter. KLM indeed
used mediator monotonicity to obtain bounds on ATEM=1 and ATTM=1. So a supporter of
the estimand ATEM=1 may argue that if one is willing to assume mediator monotonicity, there
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is no paradox regarding ATEM=1. However, it is worthwhile to point out that under mediator
monotonicity, the pure indirect effect is guaranteed to be nonnegative because βM = P(S =
mi) − P(S = ma) = P(S = mi) ≥ 0. Empirical researchers should be mindful of and clearly
communicate the consequences of the mediator monotonicity assumption unless it is compelling
in the specific application. See KLM’s discussion after their Assumption 2 on when mediator
ignorability may be violated. This concern can be alleviated if future work can incorporate non-zero
P(S = ma) as sensitivity parameters in KLM’s bounds.
B Derivation of the causal risk ratio
To simplify the derivation, we will omit the conditioning on X = x below. Fix a d ∈ {0, 1}. Using
Assumption 1, E[Y (d) |M(d) = 0] = E[Y (d, 0) |M(d) = 0] = 0. Therefore
E[Y (d)] = E[Y (d) |M(d) = 1] · P(M(d) = 1)
= E[Y (d, 1) |M(d) = 1] · P(M(d) = 1)
= E[Y (d, 1) |M(d) = 1, D = d] · P(M(d) = 1)
= E[Y |M = 1, D = d] · P(M(d) = 1).
The third equality above uses treatment ignorability: D ⊥ Y (d, 1) | M(d) (this follows from
the single world intervention graph corresponding to Figure 1); the last equality follows from the
consistency (or stable unit value treatment) assumption for potential outcomes. By further using
D ⊥ M(d), we have P(M(d) = 1) = P(M(d) = 1 | D = d) = P(M = 1 | D = d). Plugging
this into the last display equation, we have
E[Y (d)] = E[Y |M = 1, D = d] · P(M = 1 | D = d), d = 0, 1.
Thus we have recovered KLM’s Proposition 2 (point identification of ATE) without assuming
their Assumption 2 (mediator monotonicity) and Assumption 3 (relative nonseverity of racial
stops). To get the causal risk ratio, we only needs to take a ratio between E[Y (1)] and E[Y (0)]
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and apply Bayes’ formula to cancel out P(M = 1).
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